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Summary findings
Soloaga  and Winters apply a gravity  model  to data on  Trade liberalization  efforts  in Latin America  have had
annual nonfuel  imports  for 58 countries  for the years  a positive  impact on the imports  of bloc members
1980-96, to quantify  the effects  on trade of recently  (Andean  Group, Central  American  Common  Market,
created  or revamped  preferential  trade agreements  Latin American  Integration  Association,  and
(PTAs).  MERCOSUR).  Increasing  propensities  to export
They  modify  the usual gravity  equation  to identify  the  generally  accompanied  increasing  propensities  to import,
separate  effects  of PTAs  on intra-bloc  trade, members'  suggesting  that general trade liberalization  had a strong
total imports, and members'  total exports.  They also  effect.  The exception  was MERCOSUR,  for which
formally  test the significance  of changes  in the estimated  import and export propensities  displayed  opposite
coefficients  before and after the blocs' formation.  movements,  with exports performing  worse than
Their estimates  give  no indication  that the "new  wave"  expected  over the mid-1990s.  Although  MERCOSUR
of regionalism  boosted  intra-bloc  trade significantly.  members  have undoubtedly  liberalized  since  the mid-
They found convincing  evidence  of trade diversion  1980s,  these  results  suggest  that their trade performance
only  for the European  Union and the European  Free  has been influenced  more by competitiveness  than by
Trade  Association.  For the same  blocs  they also observed  trade policy.
"export diversion,"  which  would be consistent  with these
blocs' imposing  a welfare  cost on the rest of the world.
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During the last 10 years, regionalism  has re-emerged as a major issue in the policy
agenda. In the Americas, the new Common  Market of the South (MERCOSUR,  1991)  and the
North American Free Trade Association  (NAFTA, 1994) were created while old Preferential
Trade Agreements  (PTAs) like the Andean Pact (ANDEAN)  and the Central American  Common
Market  (CACM)  started a process  of renewal in the late 80's and early 90's. In Africa  new PTAs
were formed on the basis of old ones (e.g., in 1994 the Union Economique  et Monaitarie de
l'Africa  Occidentale-UEMOA-was  created  out  of the Communaute  Economique  de  l'Afrique
Occidentale-CEAO-, and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa-COMESA-
revived  and expanded  the Preferential  Trade Area for Eastern  and Southern  African States  -PTA)
and old ones were revamped  (e.g., in the early 90's the Union  Duaniere et Economique  d'Afica
Centrale  -UDEAC). In Asia, countries  in the Association  of Southeast  Nations (ASEAN)  formed
in 1992  the ASEAN  Free Trade Area (AFTA).
Although  we are experiencing  this 'second wave' of regionalism, the effect of PTAs on
trade is still an open question.  Do they really increase trade among  members? Will the second
wave of PTAs differ from the first? Do they contribute  to further trade liberalization  with non-
members countries or undermine it? Do they harm non-member  countries? This paper aims to
provide  answers  to some of these questions by exploring  the effects of recent and revived PTAs
on intra- and on extra-bloc  trade.
We consider  nine PTAs'. Five of them were either created (MERCOSUR,  NAFTA) or
revamped (ASEAN,  CACM, ANDEAN)  during the 90's and one other deepened significantly
(EU). By using data up to 1996 we can compare  blocs' patterns of trade "before and after" this
second wave of regionalism  and assess-for first time to our knowledge-the wave's effect on
blocs' trade. We use the gravity model to quantify the trade effects, but refine it relative to
previous exercises. Existing gravity-model  approaches  to this issue have identified  bloc effects
on intra-bloc  trade and on total bloc trade. We go beyond that by identifying  separate effects on
intra-bloc trade, members' total imports and their total exports, the latter being the crucial
determinant of blocs' welfare effects on the Rest of the World (ROW). We also innovate by
formally testing the significance  of changes in the estimated coefficients  before and after blocs'
1 See  Annex  I for  the list  of PTAs  and  country  members.
2formation. Finally  we comment  on a number of misconceptions-about  the specification  of gravity
models in the literature.
The paper begins with a statement  of the model, follows with a brief description  of the
data used and recent developments  in the PTAs modeled, and then presents  the results. The final
section summarizes  the findings  and conclusions.
The gravity model
In the basic  gravity model, trade  between  two  countries depends  on  their  size (GDP,
population,  land  area)  and  on  transaction  costs  (distance,  cultural  similarities).  Its  empirical
robustness has made  it the work-horse for  investigations of the geographical  patterns  of trade.
Tinbergen  (1962), PoyhBnen (1963)  and  Linneman  (1966) provided  initial  specifications  and
estimates of the determinants of trade flows and Aitken (1973) applied it to PTAs. More recently,
Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff (1997) have
provided partial theoretical foundations  for the gravity equation, although none of the models
generate exactly the equation generally used in empirical work.
When used to address the effect of a PTA on the direction of trade, the basic model was
first extended with a dummy variable to capture its effect on intra-bloc trade - that is the sum of
trade-creation  and  trade-diversion  for the  PTA  (e.g. Aitken,  1973; Braga,  Safadi  and  Yeats,
1994). More recently, researchers have added a second set of dummies to capture the PTA effect
on trade  of bloc  members with  non-members  (Bayoumi  and Eichengreen,  1995; and Frankel,
1997). By combining the two dummies (intra-bloc trade and extra-bloc trade) these authors were
able to separate cases where PTAs were trade-creating only (that is, they caused intra-bloc trade
to increase above 'normal'  levels without changes in extra-bloc trade) from those where a PTAs'
increase  in  intra-bloc  trade  came  at  the  expense  of  lower  extra-bloc  trade.  These  authors
identified the latter effect  with  'trade  diversion',  but since these  dummies for  extra-bloc trade
covered both  imports and  exports they were capturing  diversionary  consequences  on  flows in
both  directions.  This  is  legitimate,  but  it  does not  correspond  precisely  to  most  theoretical
analyses of trade diversion. Moreover, bloc members'  imports and exports could follow different
patterns.
To address this issue we extend the basic gravity model by defining three sets of dummy
variables for each trade bloc: one that captures intra-bloc trade, a second that captures imports by
members from all countries (members  and non-members),  and a third that captures  exports by
bloc members to all countries. The last two dummies reflect respectively overall bloc "openness"
3to imports and exports, while the intra-bloc dummy reflects the additional effect of a given PTA
on members'  trade. By summing the intra-bloc coefficient with that of the overall bloc imports
we  can get an indication  of how different  from  'normality'  ('normality'  being  defined by  the
gravity variables and the average behavior of countries in the sample) are total intra-bloc imports.
In our model, the 'traditional'  trade-diversion  effect will be identified by a falling propensity to
import  from  all  sources  coupled  with  an  increase  in the  overall  propensity  to  import  from
members. If the  latter outweighs the former we also have trade creation.
The set of dummies for  bloc  exports to  all  countries differentiates  our  research  from
previous exercises. Winters (1997) argues that, in assessing the welfare effects of PTAs on non-
members, the appropriate indicator is the latter's  imports-i.e.,  members'  exports-rather  than the
more commonly considered non-members'  exports to members -members'  imports. This aspect
has generally  been  neglected in ex-post  empirical  studies  of PTAs  and is, to  our knowledge,
treated here for the first time with a gravity equation.3 A negative coefficient on the dummy for a
given PTA's  exports to non-members would indicate  that, relative to the norm  defined by the
gravity equation, the PTA  is harmful to non-member countries. 4 For want of a better  term, we
name this effect 'export diversion'.
Our gravity model explains  bilateral  trade  between a  country  (i), the  importer,  and  a
specific trading partner (j), the exporter, in terms of the following equation:
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where
2  In defining  the dummies,  we could equivalently  have chosen  the bloc imports  and  bloc exports  dummies
to reflect only  extra-bloc  trade (bloc imports  from and bloc exports  to, non-members).  In that case,
we would  have interpreted  the intra-bloc  dummy  as total (not the additional)  bloc trade,  and identified
'traditional'  trade diversion  with a falling  propensity  to import  from non-members  coupled  with an
increasing  propensity  to import  from members.  Again,  if the latter  effect  outweighs the former  we
can also identify  trade creation.  One can switch  from the dummy  defnition used in the paper  to this
alternative  definition  by adding  to the intra-bloc  dummy  coefficient  the sum of the coefficients  for
imports  and exports.  What  is important  though, is that by modeling  three bloc dummies,  we can
identify  more  appropriately  trade diversion  and  trade creation.
3 For other  non  gravity  model  approaches  to this issue,  see,  for instance,  Foroutan  (1998),  Yeats  (1998),
and Chang  and Winters  (1999).
4 Of course,  this effect  could be off-set  by improvements  in the rest of the world's terms of trade,  although
in general  one expects  PTAs to worsen  these  - see Winters  and Chang(forthcoming)
4X.  is the value of imports of country i from countryj,
Ym  is the Gross Domestic Product of country m,
Nm is the population of country m,
D,  is the average distance of country i  to exporter partners, weighted by exporters'  GDP share
in world GDP ("remoteness" of country i)5,
Dj  is the distance between the economic center of gravity of the respective countries,
A,i is a dummy that takes value 1 if countries  i and]  share a land border and 0 otherwise
T.  is the land area of country m,
Im is a dummy that takes value I when country m  is an island,
L,j is a dummy for cultural affinities, proxied by the use of the same language in countriesi andj
(one dummy for each one of the following languages: English, Spanish, Arabic and Portuguese).
P,,j is a dummy variable representing the kth preference relationship  between countries i and j.
This variable takes the value 1 if both countries i and],  belong to the same bloc k; it captures the
additional effect of the PTA on bloc trade,
Pk,  j  is a dummy variable that takes the value  I when the importer country i belongs to the kth
preference trade agreement. This variable represents the overall "openess" to imports of bloc k,
Pk-if is a dummy variable that takes the value  1 when the exporter country j belongs to the kth
preference trade agreement. This variable represents the overall "openess" to exports of bloc k
B,A  to/A 12 'Ykj,'Yk-j  and Yk-iI  are parameters,  and
C.  is a log-normally distributed error term with E(Lnc,)  = 0.
As indicated above, the gravity variables of the model (GDP, population,  area, distance,
cultural similarities) control for those factors that are assumed to explain 'normal'  trade between
countries.  Thus,  the  relationship  between  trade  and  these  variables  for  the  sample  countries
defines the anti-monde for PTA members: in the absence of a PTA members'  trade  would have
5 The hypothesis  is that, after controlling  for distance  between i and j,  the further  is country  i from all its
partners  , the greater  will be its imports  from countryj (Polak,  1996).  One might expect  to see
Australia  and New  Zealand  trading more  with each other  than an other  pair of countries  separated  by
the same  distance  but with lots of other  trading  partners  close  to hand (Spain  and Poland, for
instance).
5the same  relationship  to the gravity variables  as the other countries in the sample. In this setting,
the bloc-related  dummy  variables pick up 'abnormal' levels of trade that could be attributed  to a
PTA or to unobservable  characteristics  of country  members.
The Data
We used annual non-fuel imports data for 58 countries (Annex I  shows the list of
countries)  for 1980  to 1996  from the UN-COMTRADE  database.  This set of countries  represents
around 70% of total world imports in the period covered. The distance variable, generously
provided  by Lant Pritchett, is the great circle distance between  economic  centers. The source for
the rest of variables  utilized is the World  Bank's Economic  and Social  Data (BESD).
The Econometric  Approach
Because trade values are bounded from below by zero, the appropriate estimation
procedure  is a Tobit model 6.
The estimated  equation  is:
(2)  LnXA' = a  + ,B1  LnY,  + /I2LnN,  + /33LnYj + 634LnNj + /35LnDf, + 836LnD. +
/37LinA,  ±+±8LnT,  + 89LnTj  + /lOLnI,  +,/1  lLnIj  + f12LnL  +Erkrj  LnPj
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We start our sample in 1980  and explore the existence  of both 'anticipation  effects' (i.e.,
the level of trade between country members rising above 'normal'  levels before the PTA is
formally commenced-as indicated, for instance, in Freund and McLaren ,1998), and any non-
PTA relationships  between members that may have been at work since well before the PTAs
were created/revived.  While the former  can be thought  of as a 'genuine' PTA effect, the latter is
not; it just reflects  the possibility  that the PTA is formed  between  countries  that already  have long
standing economic  ties. Table 1 provides a brief description  of main developments  in the nine
PTAs analyzed,  and identifies different periods for their (expected) effects on trade. It seems
appropriate  for our purposes  to center our 'before and after' analysis of 'new-wave' regionalism
6 See,  for  example,  Maddala  [1992]  for  a discussion  of the  bias  in OLS  estimates  in models  with  limited
dependent  variables.
6on the years 1989-94, and also to use the earlier years of our sample for  the cases of EU, EFTA
and GULFCOOP.
We made two different sets of estimates of equation (2). The first is a set of 17 separate
regressions-one  for  each year-for  the annual data  1980-96, and is presented  in Table  2. From
these we seek to identify not only the 'level'  effect on trade of PTAs but also any variation of this
effect through time, in particular around the years marked in the last column  of  Table  17.  This
permits us to make an 'event  study'  around those years,  in the belief that seventeen years gives
enough time 'before'  and 'after'  the various PTA 'events'  to offer a good chance of determining
whether the observed 'abnormalities'  in trade are directly associated with preference effects 8.
Second, we averaged values of all variables  for  1980-82, 1986-88 and  1995-96, pooled
the data and estimated a single regression allowing for all the coefficients to be different  in the
three  periods9. From  this  we  tested  whether  the  estimates  obtained  for  the  1995-96 period
(considered as post-integration/revival years) were different from those obtained for 1986-88 (the
pre-integration/revival  years)'0. Results from the pooled data are presented in Table  3. Thus we
use annual estimates  to  'visualize'  the trade  patterns,  identifying whether or not there  are key
turming  points, and average data to test statistically for the significance of changes.
Once we pool data over time movements in the real exchange rate and competitiveness
become important, and so we add a real exchange rate variable to the equation. Country's iO) real
exchange  rate was defined  as the  local currency  value  of  1 US$, multiplied  by  the US GDP
deflator and divided  by country's  ia)  GDP  deflator, where  i is the  importer country  andj  the
11 exporter
Real exchange rate and price variables make no sense in a purely cross-sectional context,
because the data reflect only movements through time (usually relative  to the base year  of the
7  As in Frankel (1997), to make  the coefficients  estimated  comparable,  we include  the same set of regional
dummies  every year, even  when  the PTA was not yet in effect.
8 This  is a key feature  present  in many gravity  models  since Aitken's (1973)  pioneering  work.
9 The use of period averages  smoothes  the effects  that transient  phenomena (e.g.  business  cycle or
economic  shocks) may have on any particular  year.
10Additionally,  we tested  whether  parameters  for 1986-88  were different  from those estimated  for 1980-
82. This is relevant for the older  and well established  PTAs in the sample  (EU and EFTA)  and for GCC.
Results  (not presented  here) did not change  when  using the IMF's real effective  exchange  rate
measurement,  which  is a single measure  by country  that weights  all trading  partners' bilateral
exchange  rate  by their share in imports.
7index used) with no indication of whether a country's  currency-is over-valued or undervalued'2.
To try to eliminate  the  spurious cross-section  effect, therefore,  we  specify  our  real exchange
variables such that their means over the three observations (1980-82, 86-88 and 95-96) are zero.
This is equivalent to assuming that countries are in exchange rate equilibrium at the means and
identifying  the  exchange  rate  effects  only  by  the  movements  through  time  relative  to  those
means.
We also add time dummies for two of our three periods (the third is, of course rolled into
the constant). This makes our model similar to Matyas'  (1997) fixed-effects model, although he
includes time-invariant fixed effects for each individual country where we include dummies for
each (bloc x time) combination. Matyas states that  in a correctly specified gravity model, bloc
dummies are mere linear combinations of the fixed effects (p.365). Even with country-specific
dummies this is not correct because the bloc dummies pertain to flows between a set of importers
and only a subset of their supplying exporters, and so can not be represented by variables which
treat all partners symmetrically. Thus below, contrary toMatyas'  claim, we can identify, estimate
and interpret dummies on trade between bloc members in addition to the fixed effects.
Results
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters and the asymptotic significance tests for the set
of 17 annual regressions. As in many other applications the central variables of the gravity model
-the  level of GDP of countries i and j,  the area of these countries, and the absolute distance
between i andj--  have the expected sign and are all  significant at  1%: trade  increases with the
level of GDP of the importer and exporter and decreases with size and distance.  The variables
reflecting population (of importer and of exporter) were positive and almost always significant.
The degree of 'remoteness'  of the importer country from its suppliers had the expected
positive  sign and was always significant. The estimated parameters forcommon  land borders
were not  significant in any  year  of the sample,  reflecting  probably some  colinearity  with the
,13 parameter for 'remoteness'
12 Thus, it seems  to us that Bergstrand's  (1985,1989)  attempts  to incorporate  price effects  into the gravity
model  are not informative.  Only  if one appeals  to some concept  of absolute  PPP can exchange  rate or
price variables  be interpreted  in cross-sectional  estimates.
13 When the model  was estimated  without  the variable 'remoteness',  border  turned out positive  and
statistically  significant.
8The coefficient  for importer is an island was negative and statistically significant only
in the period 1986-1992 and in 1995, whereas the coefficient for exporter is an island was in
general positive and  only significant in  1992-93 and in  199614.  Regarding  the proxies used for
'cultural  similarities'  (common language), only Spanish and Arabic turned out to be positive and
significant all the years of the sample,  with English positive  and significant only  in  1987 and
1995.
The model  was estimated in  logs. Thus  the percentage  equivalent  for  any dummy  is:
[exp(Dummy coefficient)-1]*100.  For example,  the  intra-bloc  parameter  for  MERCOSUR  in
1996 is 2.77,  indicating  that  MERCOSUR members traded  between  themselves  about  fifteen
times [=(exp(2.77)- 1)*  100] more than expected from the gravity and overall bloc trade variables
alone. Similarly, their imports from non-members were 66% below what could be expected and
their exports 30% below expected levels. The net effect  of the three  dummies  is that  in 1996,
MERCOSUR members traded 418% [=(exp(2.77-1.09-0.36)-1)*  100] more with each other than
would be predicted by the basic gravity model. This is not saying that  MERCOSUR increased
intra-trade  by 418%, however. What matters  analytically is less the  level of these  effects than
their changes around the periods of integration.
From table  2 it is clear that the results  are far from homogenous  across PTAs. In the
period 1980 to 1996 we have that:
*  In all  the cases involving only Latin American countries-CACM,  LAIA, ANDEAN,  and
MERCOSUR-the  intra-bloc trade coefficient was positive and statistically significant for the
whole sample. For NAFTA it was positive and never significant whereas for GULFCOOP it
was positive and significant only in 1980 and in 1992-96. The coefficient  for the intra-bloc
trade was negative for EU, EFTA and ASEAN, but consistently significant only in the case
of EU. Thus, after controlling for gravity variables  and general trade behavior, only a few
PTAs trade significantly more with themselves than expected.
*  The coefficients for overall bloc imports (from members as well as from non-members) were
almost always statistically significant (the exception was GULFCOOP). This coefficient was
14 Not all the researchers  use a dummy  for island. Its inclusion  here is based only  on a wish  to be
comprehensive  so that  our PTA effects  of interest are not biased by unwanted exclusions  .Regarding
its sign, some  authors found  the dummy  for Island  to be positive  and significant  for the importer  as
well as for the exporter  (Montenegro  and Soto, 1996)  whereas  others  found that  the sign  depends  on
the direction  of trade-  positive  when imports  are modeled  as the independent  variable,  and negative
for exports  (Havrylyshyn  and Pritchett,  1991).
9negative  for the  four Latin American  PTAs and  positive  in the  other cases  (EU, EFTA,
ASEAN and NAFTA)
*  The  coefficients  for  overall  bloc  exports  were  negative  and  almost  always  statistically
significant in five of the nine PTAs (GULFCOOP, NAFTA, CACM, LAIA, and ANDEAN),
always  positive  and  significant  for  ASEAN,  and  always  positive  but significant  only  in
1980-86 and  1993 for  EFTA. The bloc  export coefficients for  the EU were  positive and
significant over 1980-86 and negative after 1990. Something similar happened in the case of
MERCOSUR, the dummy was positive up to 1991 and negative in 1992-96, significantly so
since 1993
To answer the questions posed at the beginning of the paper, however, we need to go beyond
the absolute level of the estimated dummies and consider whether there is a noticeable change in
their  level around the years  indicated in Table  1. A useful way of looking to the results  is to
group the PTAs by levels of development and continent. To ease exposition, the annual dummy
coefficients  of table 2  are plotted over time  in Figurel.  In addition,  Table  3 reports tests  on
whether they have varied significantly over 1980-96, using averaged data.
a) Europe. The temporal pattern of trade is almost identical for EU and EFTA. Intra-bloc
trade  is always  below  'normal'  and  has  a  strong  positive  trend  since  1985  (EU)  and  1986
(EFTA).  Although  the annual  coefficients  are  statistically  significant  for the  EU,  the  pooled
equation shows that for neither bloc were the coefficients for the average of years 1980-82, 1996-
98,  and  1995-96 statistically  different  from one another" 5. For both  European PTAs,  although
overall  bloc imports and  exports were above 'expected'  levels, they  showed a  strong negative
trend  since  1986. Also  for  both  PTAs the  pooled  coefficients  for  imports  in  1995-96 were
significantly  lower than those  for the average of  1980-82, while the propensity  to  export was
lower in 1986-88 and 1995-96 than in 1980-82.
These results are somewhat similar to those of Sapir (1997), who found that  increased
integration within the EU has impacted negatively on EU imports from European non-members
and prompted their application for EU membership. In addition, we have identified the presence
of 'export-diversion'  in both PTAs
15 Although  the average  of 1995-96  was different  to that of 1980-82  for the EU at the 90% confidence
level.
10h) South-South  PTAs  in the Americas:  The situation in Latin America is different. All
four PTAs show intra-bloc trade above expected levels. The annual estimates suggest that,
although  these coefficients  were always statistically  significant,  they did not vary much over the
whole sample, as the results from the pooled data corroborated  when comparing coefficients
statistically  over 1986-88  and 1995-96.
All four PTAs exhibit a positive trend in members' propensity  to import since the late
80s, but only for CACM  and for MERCOSUR  was this coefficient  statistically  higher in 1995-96
than in 1986-88.
In CACM, LAIA and ANDEAN,  the coefficient  for bloc exports also showed  a positive
trend since the early 90's, while the trend was negative for MERCOSUR.  In none of the cases,
however,  were the estimates  for 1995-96  statistically  different  from those of 1986-88.
Thus, when we control for the impact  of the gravity  variables such as GDP, population,
etc, the revamping (CACM and ANDEAN) or launching (MERCOSUR)  of PTAs in Latin
America does not seem to have been accompanied  by a noticeable increase in intra-bloc  trade
propensities. The positive trend in  the estimated coefficients for  bloc members'  imports,
significant in the cases of CACM and MERCOSUR,  presumably reflects the unilateral trade
liberalization  that swept Latin America in the late 80's and early 90's. The increases in CACM
and ANDEAN  members' overall export  coefficients  also reflect liberalization,  while the opposite
trend in MERCOSUR,  suggests  that its members' trade performance  was dominated  by currency
overvatuation  rather  than trade policy.
c) NAFTA.  Besides EFTA,  NAFTA is the only bloc where the coefficients  for intra-bloc
trade were never significant.  Annual results show an upward  trend practically  since  the beginning
of our sample. The coefficient for overall imports showed a negative trend since 1986 and was
statistically  significant  for virtually  the whole period (except for 1991). The export coefficients
turned from positive  in 1980-83  to negative  in 1984-86,  without appreciable  changes since 1986.
Although  we observe some indication  of export-diversion  in the annual data (in 1992 and 1994-
1995 ), none of the three dummies  differed significantly  in 1995-96  from its value in 1986-88.
Thus, it seems that the key developments  NAFTA members' trade policies (Mexico's unilateral
liberalization  in mid 80's, CUSFTA  in 1988  and NAFTA itself signed by the end of 1992)  were
1Inot associated  with appreciable  changes  in intra or extra bloc trade, once  we take into account  the
'normal' variation  in trade levels  that follows  changes  in the gravity  variables' 6.
d) ASEAN. The annual estimates  show that the intra-bloc  trade coefficient  was in general
negative, with a pronounced  negative trend between 1987 and 1995. The coefficient for bloc
imports was almost always positive,  and significant  since 1987, while the coefficient  for bloc
exports was always positive and significant.  The estimates on averaged data showed that the
bloc's propensity  to import from bloc members was significantly  lower and to import overall
significantly  higher  in 1995-96  than in 1986-88 (and than in 1980-82).
e) GULF  COOPERATION  COUNCIL. The intra-bloc  trade coefficient  was always
positive  (except for 1985),  significant  in 1980 and in 1992-96,  and trending  upwards  since 1986.
The coefficient  for bloc imports  was only significant  in 1996,  with a negative  trend since 1993,
while the coefficient  for bloc exports  was always negative  and statistically  significant,  showing  a
sharp positive  trend up to 1986.  In table 1 we marked 1982  as the key year for this PTA.  The test
run on the pooled data showed  that only the export  propensity  was statistically  different  (higher)
in 1986-88  than in 1980-82.
These results are similar  to some of Frankel's (1997),  the piece of literature most closely
related to ours. He estimated several variants of his model and got widely varying results. His
estimates  for a series of single  years suggest  the existence  of significant  trade diversion  (e.g. table
4.2), but the specification on which he bases his policy conclusions,  which assumes constant
effects over the period 1970-92  (!), suggests  little diversion  and a good deal additional  trade due
to PTAs (e.g. p.226-7).  We find the former  set of results more persuasive  than the latter.
6The coefficient  for  exports  was  statistically  lower  in 1995-96  and 1986-88  than  in 1980-82,  which  might
conceivably  be an anticipatory  effect  of CUSFTA.
12Conclusions
We have applied a  gravity model to annual non-fuel imports data for 58 countries
representing  more than 70% of world imports. The effects of PTAs were captured by dummies
that reflected intra-bloc  trade as well as, separately,  bloc imports and bloc exports. These bloc-
related  coefficients  were  statistically  tested  for  changes  "before  and  after"  blocs
revival/formation.
In summary,
1.  When we allow for gravity and overall trade effects, we found no indication that the 'new
wave' of regionalism boosted intra-bloc trade significantly.  When testing intra-bloc trade
"before and after" years of bloc revamping/creation  we found no statistically significant
change in the propensity  for intra-bloc  trade.
2.  Only for EU and EFTA did we find convincing  evidence  of trade diversion.  After controlling
for gravity variables,  the EU's and EFTA's propensity  to import were significantly  lower in
1995-96  than in 1980-82.  On the other hand, in the four Latin American  PTAs we observed a
positive trend in the estimated  coefficients  for bloc members' overall imports, although the
increment  was statistically  significant  only for CACM  and MERCOSUR.
3.  We also found evidence of export-diversion  in EU and EFTA, which would be consistent
with their imposing  a welfare cost on the ROW. In Latin America increasing  propensities  to
export generally accompanied increasing propensities to import, suggesting strong effects
from general trade liberalization.  The exception was MERCOSUR,  for which import and
export propensities displayed opposite movements. While MERCOSUR members have
undoubtedly liberalized since the  mid-1980s, these  results  suggest  that  their  trade
performance  has been influenced  more by competitiveness  than by trade policy.References
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PTA's  in theAMERICAS
ANDEANPACT  Bolivia  *  Summit  in Cartagena  in 1989  sought  to perfect  the Custom  Union.  1990-91
Signed:  1969  Chile  (left in 1976)  *  Act of La Paz in Nov.1990  (FTA for Bolivia,Colombia,  and Venezuela)
(Changed  name  to ANDEAN  Colombia  and Act of Barahona  in Dec. 1991 (Ecuador and Peru joined the FTA)
Community  since  1996)  Ecuador  renewed  the PTA..
Peru (left in 1992)  *  Unilateral  trade  liberalization  in the region  since 1989-90.
Venezuela  (joined  in 1973)  *  Act of Trujillo in March 1996 revitalized  political commitment  for
integration.
CACM  Costa  Rica  El Salvador  *  Declarations  of Antigua  and of Puntarenas in 1990,  and Declations  of San  1990-91
1960  Guatemala  Honduras  Salvador  and of Tegucigalpa  in 1991, renewed  the PTA.
Nicaragua  *  New  scheduled  for convergence  to CET  by 2000  was set in 1996.
*  Unilateral  trade  liberalization  in the region since  1987-89.
LAIA  1980  Argentina  Bolivia  *  All members  have double  membership  (to LAIA  and to sub-groups  within
(Formerly  LAFTA, signed  in  Brazil  LAIA). It is generally thought that  LAIA had limited effect once the





17 Sources:  Foroutan,  1998;  Ng, 1997;  Wyploz,  1997;  and IMF, 1994.
18The formation  or renewal  of PTA's is expected  to influence  trade patterns  on or around  the years indicated  in this column.
19Foroutan  ,1998;  IDB, 1997;  Thoumi,  1989TABLE 1: PTA'S MEMBERSHIP  AND KEY DEVELOPMENTS"
MERCOSUR  Argentina  *  Argentina-Brazil  protocols  1986-1989.  1991
Signed:  March  1991  Brazil  *  Unilateral  trade liberalization  started during 1988-90  in Argentina,  Brazil
Internal  trade  liberalization: Paraguay  and  Uruguay.
1991-95.  Uruguay  *  Treaty  of Asuncion-  March 1991.
Schedule for  convergence to  *  Agreement  of Ouro  Preto-  Dec.  1994  (CET  for 85% of tariff lines).
CET and to Free Trade started  *  Bolivia  and Chile  joined  MERCOSUR  as associated  members  in 1996.
in 1995
NAFTA  Canada  *  Mexico's  unilateral  trade  liberalization  started  in 1985.  1994
Signed:  December  1992  Mexico  *  Canada-US-FTA  started  in 1988.
Effective:  January 1994  US  *  NAFTA  negotiations  started  in 1990.
PTA in ASMI:
ASEAN  FTA  Indonesia  Malaysia  *  Changed  from 'Economic  Cooperation'  to FTA in 1977.Very  little intra-  1992
1992  Singapore  Thailand  bloc liberalization
(Formerly ASEAN, signed in  Philippines  *  AFTA  created  in Jan-1992.
1967)  *  Unilateral  trade  liberalization  in some countries:  tariffs levels  in 1994  were
1/2 of the average  level in 1986-90  in Thailand;  2/3 in Philippines  and
about  the same  in  Indonesia  and Malaysia.
PTA in MIDDLE EAST:
GULF  COOPERATION Bahrain  Kuwait  *  Virtual elimination  of customs  tariffs by  1982 and liberalization  of trade  1982-83
COUNCIL-  Signed  in  Oman  Qatar  and services  by 1983.
May 1981  Saudi-Arabia
United  Arab  Emirates
(UAE)TABLE 1: PTA'S  MEMBERSHIP  AND KEY DEVELOPMENTS
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PTA 's in EUROPE
EFTA 1960  Austria (left in 1995)  *  Lost many members to the EC.  1985-86 (impact
Denmark (left in 1972)  *  The European Economic Area, in effect since 1994, created a FTA between  of the Single
Norway  remaining EFTA members (with the  exception of  Switzerland) and EU.  European Act),
Portugal  (left in 1985)  (An agreement of free trade in manufactures between EEC and EFTA was  1994
Sweden  (left  in 1995)  in place  since 1974).
Switzerland
United  Kingdom (left  in
1972)
Iceland  (joined  in 1970)
Finland  (associated  in 1961,
full membership  in 1986,
left  in 1995)
Liechtenstein  (joined  in
1991)
EU (since 1993)  *  Single European  Act (1986-87)  set the goal of a single European market  1985-86,
(Originally  EEC,  signed  in  France  for goods,  labor  and capital  in Europe  in 1992  (to be known as "1992").  1992-93
1957)  Germany  *  Maastricht  Treaty,  (Dec. 1991).  Countries  agreed  on a formal  plan to create
Belgium  a closer economic  and political union. The economic  component  of the
Italy  treaty  mainly  involves  the adoption  of a single  currency  by 1999.
Luxembourg  *  Enactment  of the Maastricht  Treaty  (Nov. 1993)
Netherlands
United Kingdom  (oined in
1973)
Denmark  (joined  in 1973)
Ireland  (joined  in 1973)TABLE 1: PTA'S  MEMBERSHIP  AND KEY DEVELOPMENTS' 7
EU (Cont)
Greece aoined in 1981)
Spain (joined in 1986)
Portugal (oined  in 1986)
Austria  (oined  in 1995)
Finland aoined in 1995)
Sweden (joined in 1995)TABLE  2
GRAVITY  MODEL  ESTIMATES
Equation (2_
Gravity variables
Log  Log  Dummy=1  um  Dummy=
Log  GDP  at  Log  GDP  at  Log  Log  Average  Absolute  Dmy  1I  if  1 if
INTERCEPT  current  prices,  t  Populaion  Populaion  d  n  distane  d  Importer  Eporter  Area
importer  (i  eporeres,  importer  (i)  exporter  (i)  of  countryr  i  between  i  share  is  an  is  anImotr  Epte
exporter  ~~~~~from  adj  borders  Island  Island
exporters
Pseudo-
Year  R2  _
80  0.71  -17.53  1.12"  1.37  0.10  0.10  1.29 - -0.96  - -0.06"  -0.04  0.21  "  -0.21 - -0.22
81  0.71  -16.24  1.11 "  1.35  0.08 *  '  0.17  1.11  "  -0.98  "  0.08  -0.11  0.04 - -0.18 "  -0.21
82  0.71  -11.96  1.12-  1.34"  0.15  0.19"  0.46  -0.93-  0.22 - -0.03  0.09  -0.18  -0.20
83  0.72  -13.55  1.16  - 1.36-  0.04  0.18  - 0.74"  -0.99  - 0.05"  -0.11  0.09  -0.16  -0.21
84  0.72  -15.58  1.15  1.36  - 0.12  0.30  0.87-  -1.06  -0.08"  -0.17  0.01  -0.16  -0.18 "
85  0.72  -18.37  1.11  1.32  0.09  0.31  1.21  -1.04  -0.13 - -0.22  0.10  -0.14  -0.15
86  0.74  -15.71  1.12 - 1.33  0.10  0.29  '''  0.88  -1.00  -0.03  - -0.21  0.06  0.19  *  -0.13
87  0.74  -15.05  1.12 "  1.31 - 0.08  "  0.24  0.86  -1.01  -0.06"  -0.35  0.00  -0.19  -0.11
88  0.74  -14.01  1.06 -*  1.28"  0.20  0.26  0.67  -1.03  -0.02 - -0.22  -0.09  -0.14  -0.10
89  0.75  -15.98  1.06  "  1.24  - 0.16  0.28 - 0.92  -1.02  -0.03  -0.26  -0.02  -0.12  -0.11
90  0.76  -15.98  1.02  - 1.25 - 0.11  "  0.25 - 0.94  -0.97  0.04  -0.29  0.02  -0.09  -0.12
91  0.76  -17.24  1.02  1.28  0.17  0.21  1.03  -1.03  -0.10 - -0.29  '  0.13  -0.08  -0.11
92  0.76  -17.44  - 1.08  1.26  0.08  0.24  1.11  -1.07  -0.10"  -0.30  0.20  -0.11  -0.08
93  0.77  -17.62  1.07  - 1.27  0.10 - 0.19  1.14  -1.08  -0.11  -0.10  0.24  -0.10  -0.08
94  0.76  -17.09-  1.03  1.23  0.13  0.21  '''  1.07  "  -1.09  -0.12"  -0.08  0.08  -0.08  "  -0.04
95  0.76  -16.95  1.00  - 1.17 "  0.18 "  0.28 - 0.88 - -1.02  -0.28  -0.24  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01
96  0.72  -17.91  0.95  1.19  0.34  0.48 - 0.56  -0.90"  -0.19  0.01  0.35  -0.05  -0.03
MEAN  -16.13  1.08  1.29  0.13  0.25  0.92  -1.01  -0.05  -0.18  0.09  -0.13  -0.12
MAX  -11.96  1.16  1.37  0.34  0.48  1.29  -0.90  0.22  0.01  0.35  -0.04  -0.01
MIN  -18.37  0.95  1.17  0.04  0.10  0.46  -1.09  -0.28  -0.35  -0.09  -0.21  -0.22
Tobit  estimates  on  annual  data.  Each  year  was  run  separately.
Each  PTA  has  three  dummies:  one  for intra-bloc  trade  (both  countries  I andJ are
in the PTA);  one  for imports  from extra-bloc  countries  (country  i is in the PTA);
and  for exports  to extra-bloc  countries  (countryj  is in the PTA).
Number  of obs.:  3306
Statistical  significance: 99%,  -5W1seudo R2 -1-(Sum  See/Syy)DumTr-  If  Common  language  in counbies  i and  j  Preferental  Trade  Agreements  I
SPANISH  ENGLISH  ARABIC  PORTUGUE  EU  EFTA  Exports  EFTA-  EFTA-  ASEAN  l  EAN-  OP Imports  Exports  imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  OP
Additional  Additional  Additonal  Additional
effect on  Overall  Overall  eflect on  Overall  Overall  effect on  Overall  Overall  effect on
inta-bloc  Bloc  Bloc  intra-bloc  Bloc  Bloc  intra-bloc  Bloc  Bloc  intra-bloc
Year  __  trade  Imports  Exports  trade  Imports  Exports  trade  Imports  Exports  trade
80  1.99"  0.38  - 1.91  "  1.05  -1.78 - 1.88"  0.55"  -0.74  1.60"  0.96  -0.01  0.08"  0.75"  2.20
81  1.83"  0.34 "  2.42"  1.17  -1.77  1.61  0.72"  -0.64  - 1.22-  0.90"  -0.33-  0.26"  0.68"  1.30
82  2.01  - 0.25  - 1.85"  0.73  -1.71  - 1.19"  0.81  -0.74 "  0.88"  0.95"  0.11 - 0.23  0.568  1.56
83  1.96"  0.30"  2.80"  1.11  -1.79  "  1.46"  0.85 "  -0.87  1.14"  1.09  "  -0.09 - 0.16"  0.63"  0.40
84  1.84"  0.24"  2.69"  1.22  -1.88"  1.38"  0.73"  -0.92  0.94"  0.82  0.20"  -0.04  0.49  0.81
85  2.22  0.21  - 1.72"  0.95  -1.83"  1.65"  0.77"  -0.95"  1.19"  0.86"  0.20"  -0.21  - 0.65"  -0.03
86  1.83  0.38"  2.12"  1.41  -1.48"  1.21  - 0.24"  -0.84-  0.95"  0.40"  0.53-  0.19"  0.78"  1.10
87  1.95"  0.52"  1.90"  0.76  -1.37"  1.10"  0.14"  -0.78"  0.88"  0.27"  0.32"  0.30  - 0.88"  1.57
88  1.94  0.35"  2.08"  0.84  -1.38"  0.98  0.05"  -0.80"  0.59"  0.17"  -0.01"  0.51  0.98"  1.31
89  1.81  "  0.27"  2.29"  0.35  -1.32  - 1.15  0.08"  -0.74  - 0.69"  0.16"  0.04"  0.47  0.85  t  1.52"
90  1.84  "  0.33"  2.25"  0.44  -1.13  1.17  -0.13"  -0.59"  0.68"  0.06  "  -0.44"  0.65  0.88  "  1.42"
91  1.94"  0.29"  2.16"  0.54  -1.10"  1.06  -0.22"  -0.61  "  0.53"  0.10"  -0.65"  0.56  0.94"  1.49"
92  1.98"  0.36"  1.61 "  0.39  -1.09  "  0.97  -0.23"  -0.61  "  0.65"  0.08 "  -0.76"  0.47  0.91  "  1.97"
93  2.03  - 0.36"  2.17"  0.56  -1.27  "  0.99  0.00"  -0.54"  0.61  - 0.33"  -0.90"  0.49"  0.94"  1.57"
94  1.77  0.25"  2.21  - 0.51  -1.16  0.90  -0.04  -0.52"  0.57"  0.18"  -0.74"  0.47"  0.83"  1.72"
95  1.78  - 0.46"  2.18  - 0.43  -1.01  "  0.77"  -0.05"  -0.33"  0.34"  0.04"  -1.32"  0.92  1.01 "  2.00
96  2.05  -0.12"  2.94"  1.05  -0.80"  0.50"  -0.19"  -0.43"  0.02"  0.08"  0.20"  0.44  0.80"  2.76
MEAN  1.93  0.30  2.19  0.80  -1.41  1.17  0.24  -0.69  0.79  0.44  -0.21  0.35  0.80  1.45
MAX  2.22  0.52  2.94  1.41  -0.80  1.86  0.85  -0.33  1.60  1.09  0.53  0.92  1.01  2.76
MIN  1.77  -0.12  1.61  0.35  -1.88  0.50  -0.23  -0.95  0.02  0.04  -1.32  -0.21  0.49  -0.03TPreferential  Trade  Agreements  1  Preferential  Trade  Agreements
GC-  GC-  NAFTA  NAFTA-  NAFTA-  CACM-  CACM-  LAIALA  LAA-  ANDEAN  ANDEAN-  ANDEAN-
Imports  Exports  CACM  Imports  Exports  Imports  ExLrt  Imp  Ex,ports  Imports  Exports
Additional  Additonal  Additional  Additional
Overall  Overall  effect  on  Overall  Overall  effect  on  Overall  Overall  effect  on  Overall  Overall  effect  on  Overall  Overall
Bloc  Bloc  intra-bloc  Bloc  Bloc  intra-bloc  Bloc  Bloc  intra-bloc  Bloc  Bloc  intra-bloc  Bloc  Bloc
Year  Imports  Exports  trade  Imports  Exports  trade  Imports  Exports  trade  Imports  Exports  trade  Imports  Exports
80  -0.27-  -5.20"  0.368  1.52  0.92  - 3.48  - -0.65"  -0.64-  1.43  -2.28-  -2.59  - 2.67"  -0.62-  -1.08
81  0.04"  -5.21  "  0.25-  1.27  - 0.69  - 3.96  -0.59"  -0.49-  1.75  -2.10"  -2.90"  2.67"  -1.02  -1.31
82  0.35-  -4.52"  0.42  0.69  0.61 "  4.24"  -0.98 - -0.53  1.85-  -1.88-  -2.46-  2.42  -1.03  -1.17
83  0.45  - -4.36-  0.60  0.89  - 0.468  4.37-  -0.97  -0.83  - 1.89"  -2.86  -1.59"  2.44  -1.27  -1.09
84  0.15  -4.49  0.60  0.80"  -0.04 - 4.24"  -1.17  -0.95"  2.14  -2.64"  -1.49  2.24  -1.10  -1.07
85  -0.12  -3.99-  0.81 "  0.94"  -0.18"  3.76  -1.25  -1.09  - 1.97  - -2.74-  -1.53  2.02"  -1.34  -1.16
86  0.04  -3.03"  0.73-  0.95  -0.48  3.22  -1.05 - -0.53"  1.77  -2.05  -0.52  - 2.16"  -0.88  -1.14
87  0.13"  -3.13"  0.83"  0.82  -0.48-  3.29"  -0.968  -1.02"  1.688  -2.33"  -0.31 - 1.88"  -0.73  -1.10
88  0.25  -2.79 "  0.58  0.66"  -0.49  3.23"  -0.93"  -0.90"  1.73  -1.76"  -0.29"  2.27"  -0.91  -1.11
89  0.05"  -3.00"  0.66"  0.53  -0.42"  3.67"  -0.55"  -0.74  1.84  - 1.81  -0.50"  2.29  -1.23  - .0.83"
90  -0.23 - -2.81 - 0.62  0.66  -0.33"  3.78"  -0.74"  -0.58  - 1.66"  -1.76  -0.81  "  2.32  -1.36  -0.51  "
91  -0.09  -3.34  1.03  0.43"  -0.40"  3.57  -0.63  -0.62  1.72"  -1.95"  -1.08  2.24  -0.97  -0.64"
92  0.15  -3.21  0.88"  0.59  -0.45"  3.43  -0.61  -0.52  1.53"  -1.52"  -1.12  1.96  -0.88"  -0.77"
93  -0.02  -2.90-  1.06"  0.63"  -0.39"  3.52"  -0.55  -0.71  1.49"  -1.60"  -1.43  1.77"  -0.62"  -0.78"
94  -0.24"  -2.968  0.90"  0.70"  -0.53-  3.47"  -0.57"  -0.63"  1.35  -0.968  -1.18"  2.00"  -0.55"  -0.85"
95  -0.28  -2.92"  1.05  0.44"  -0.49"  3.42"  -0.56"  -0.48"  1.41  - -0.80"  -0.05"  2.48"  -0.60"  -1.04"
96  -1.50  -2.85"  1.44"  0.52"  -0.26  - 3.86  -0.43"  -0.09  - 1.50"  -2.29"  -0.27"  2.36  -0.64 "  -0.42"
MEAN  -0.07  -3.57  0.75  0.77  -0.13  3.68  -0.78  -0.67  1.69  -1.96  -1.18  2.25  -0.93  -0.95
MAX  0.45  -2.79  1.44  1.52  0.92  4.37  -0.43  -0.09  2.14  -0.80  -0.05  2.67  -0.55  -0.42
MIN  -1.50  -5.21  0.25  0.43  -0.53  3.22  -1.25  -1.09  1.35  -2.86  -2.90  1.77  -1.36  -1.31MERCOSUR  IMERCOSUR  MERCOSUR MERCOSUR  Imports  Exports
Addtional
effect  on  intra-  Overall  Boc  Overall  Blc
Year  bloc  trade  Imports  Exports
80  2.28  -0.59  0.43
81  2.69  - -. 23  - 0.13  -
82  2.75  -1.54  0.09
83  2.92  -1.86  0.27  -
84  3.32  -2.04  0.49
85  2.94  -1.98  0.58
86  3.05  -1.45  0.09
87  2.58  -1.17  0.06
88  2.80  -1.50  0.22
89  2.59  -1.45  - 0.36
90  2.34  -1.48  0.22
91  2.09  -1.24 - 0.07
92  2.13  -1.17  -0.05
93  2.16  -0.95  -0.38
94  2.15  -0.85  -0.55
95  2.07  -0.80 - 0.35
98  2.77  -1.09  -0.36
MEAN  2.55  -1.31  0.08
MAX  3.32  -0.59  0.58
MIN  2.07  -2.04  -0.55TABLE  3
GRAVITY  ESTIMATIONS:  YEAR  AVERAGES
Test of difference  0
Estimates  Estimates  Estimates  coefficients:
Variables  Avg.86-88 Sign.  Avg.86-88 Sign.  Avg.95-96 Sign.  1=2  1=3  2=3
(1)  (2)  (3)
INTERCEPT  -12.85  0.21  -3.84
LogGDPlmporter  1.12  - 1.16  1.18
LogGDP  Exporter  1.41  1.51  1.69
LogPopulation  Importer  -0.02  -0.09  -0.19
LogPopulation  Reporter  -0.18  -0.29  -0.35
LogAvg.Distance  Importer  0.77  0.62  0.84
LogDistance  ij  -0.92  -0.97  -0.99
LogAreaRep.  -0.17  -0.16  -0.06
LogAreaPart.  -0.15  -0.09  - -0.07
LogDev.RealExchRate  Importer  0.21
LogDev.RealExchRate  Exporter  1.35
Dummy  Common  Land  Border  0.07  0.02  -0.24
Dummy  Importer  is  an Island  0.10  -0.04  0.05
Dummy  Exporter  is an Island  -0.07  -0.23  -0.14
Dummy  lor Spanish  1.78  1.64  1.70
Dummy  fhr English  0.34  0.39  0.19
DummyforArabic  1.68  1.82  2.11
Dummy  fhr Portuguese  0.59  0.97  0.88
EC  -1.45  -1.17  - -0.88
EC-imports  1.25  "  0.89  0.72
EC-Exports  0.49  0.07  -0.15
EFTA  -0.46  -0.60  -0.27
EFTA4mports  1.02  - 0.63  "  0.26
EFTA-Exports  0.62  0.15  -0.03
ASEAN  0.18  0.09  -1.06
ASEAN-Imports  0.15  0.30  0.82
ASEAN-Exports  0.70  - 0.67  0.99
GULFCOOP  1.42  1.20  2.07
GC-lmports  0.27  0.15  -0.48
GC-Exports  -4.18  - -3.02  -3.21
NAFTA  0.43  0.72  1.17
NAFTA-Imports  0.91  0.65  0.48
NAFTA-Exports  0.49  -0.58  "  -0.73
CACM  3.84  2.93  3.43
CACM-lmports  -0.84  -0.94  -0.50
CACM-Exports  -0.56  -0.50  -0.32
LAFTA  1.42  1.50  1.38  -
LAFTA-Imports  -1.83  -1.86  -1.10  -
LAFTA-Exports  -2.18  - -0.67  -0.06
ANDEAN  2.03  1.77  2.36  -
ANDEAN-imports  -0.76  -0.72  - -0.55
ANDEAN-Exports  -0.80  -1.08  - -0.79  -
MERCOSUR  2.28  2.49  - 2.15  -
MERCOSUR-imports  -1.06  - -1.32  - -0.71
MERCOSUR-Exports  0.27  -0.03  -0.06
Tobit  estimates  of one single  regression.
Number  of observations=9918.  Number  of Censored  Observations=588.  Significance:  99%,  "95%. '  90%
Pseudo  R2=1-(See/Syy)=0.76
Each  PTA  has  three dummies:  one when both  countries  i and j are  in the PTA;
another  dummy  when the importer  country i is member  of the kIh bloc,  indicated  in the table as PTA-imports;
and a  third dummy  when  the exporter  country  j is member  of the kth bloc,  indicated  as  PTA-Exports.FIGURE  1: ANNUAL  ESTIMATES
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Countries  in the sample  and Preferential  Trade Agreements
Industrial  Developing countries
Countries  Africa  America  Asia  Europe  Middle East
Canada (9)  Egypt  Argentina  Blangadesh  Turkey  Israel
(7)(8)
Usa (9)  Morocco  Bolivia (1  )(7)  Hong Kong  Greece (4)  Kuwait (6)
Tunisia  Brazil(7)(8)  India  Portugal (4)  Saudi  Arabia
(6)
Japan  Oman (6)  Chile  Indonesia (2)
Colombia  Korea
(1)(7)
Austria (5)  Costa Rica (3)  Malasya (2)
Belgium-Lux.(4)  Ecuador (1)(7)  Pakistan
Denmark (4)  El  Salvador  Philippines
(3)  (2)
Finland (5)  Guatemala (3)  Singapore (2)
France (4)  Honduras (3)  Sri Lanka
Germany (4)  Mexico (7)(9)  Thailand (2)
Ireland (4)  Nicaragua (3)  _
Italy (4)  Panama
Netherlands (4)  Paraguay
(7)(8)  _  l
Norway (5)  Peru (1)(7)  ___
Spain (4)  Trinidad-
Tobago
Sweden (5)  Uruguay
(7)(8)






PTAs: (1) ANDEAN; (2) AFTA; (3) CACM; (4) EU; (5) EFTA;
(6) GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL; (7) LAIA*; (8) MERCOSUR;
(9) NAFTA.
(*) We isolated the evolution of trade  between ANDEAN countries and between MERCOSUR
countries. Due to the membership of these countries to more than one PTA (all of them belong
also to LAIA) the regressions were estimated computing the dummies corresponding to LAIA as
follows:
LAIA* = LAIA-ANDEAN-MERCOSUR
LAIA Imports* = LAIA Imports-ANDEAN Imports-MERCOSUR Imports
LAIA Exports* = LAIA Exports-ANDEAN Exports-MERCOSUR ExportsPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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